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NATURE OF THE CASE 
CASE NO. 18100 
The respondents obtained a Default Judgment against 
defendants cancelling a Uniform Real Estate Contract after entry 
of which appellant sought to intervene in the action as a party 
defendant and to set aside the default judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court denied the motions to 
intervene and to set aside the default judgment brought by 
. 
appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to obtain the right to intervene, to 
set aside the default judgment and to assert a defense to the 
plaintiffs' complaint. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since no testimony was taken in the trial court except 
with respect to attorney's fees in connection with the default 
judgment, the parties to this appeal rely on the statement of 
evidence (R. 65 ff) jointly agreed upon. The record in the lower 
court establishes the chronology of events. After serving all 
named defendants with a Notice to Quit pursuant to the Utah 
unlawful detainer statute, Title 78-36-6, U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended, plaintiffs proceeded by complaint for cancellation of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract, forfeiture to sellers of 
payments theretofore made as liquidated damages for 
nonperformance, for a Writ of Restitution and other relief. 
In view of appellant's contention that he timely sought 
to intervene in the action, it should be noted that the Notice to 
Quit was served on appellant's co-venturer, Joseph c. Franich, on 
August 8, 1981 (see paragraph 4 of complaint). The complaint was 
filed August 19, 1981, more than five (5) days after the service 
of Notices to Quit on all known defendants. The Court shortened 
. 
the time for answer as provided in Title 78-35-8, U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended, to five (5) days (R. 10) and a copy of the summons 
and complaint was served on Joseph c. Franich, co-venturer of 
appellant, on September 11, 1981. September 23, 1981, the 
default period of five (5) days having run as against all named 
defendants, plaintiffs appeared through their counsel bef6re the 
District Judge and upon demonstrating the default, producing the 
documents evidencing the Uniform Real Estate Contract and its 
assignment and giving evidence of a reasonable attorney's fee, 
-2-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment granting the relief prayed for in the complaint with the 
exception of the amount sought as delinquent installment payments 
and taxes. The Court interpreted paragraph 16A of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract as an alternative remedy the election of 
which constituted a waiver of both delinquent installments and 
any obligation to pay taxes. 
Thus, by the time default judgment was entered on 
August 23, 1981 no payment had been made under the terms of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract since May 14, 1981 (see paragraph 3 
of Complaint R.3), a period of over four months. A Writ of 
Restitution immediately issued and was served upon appellant's 
co-venturer, Joseph c. Franich, on September 24, 1981 (R. 22). 
Appellant filed his Motion to Intervene October 6, 
1981, accompanied by his Affidavit. Exhibit "A" (R. 25, 26) 
attached to the Motion to Intervene is an agreement entered into 
the 27th of March, 1979 between appellant, Ronald Johnson, and 
defendant, Joseph C. Franich. That agreement includes the 
~allowing provisions: 
2. It is understood that the purpose of the 
agreement is for real estate investment 
purposes. 
3. The intent is to be long term investments, 
however, some shorter term investments may be 
necessary at times depending on the character 
of the property invested in. 
* * * 
5. Franich will be responsible for all 
management, collection of rents, and 
maintenance. 
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6. Franich is to invest the monies in a prudent 
manner but, provides no guarantees, except of 
return of principle amount of $11,000.00 and 
1/2 of profit. 
7. Franich is to receive 10% percent of all 
rents collected as compensation for time, gas 
and management. 
8. All monies received from properties will be 
divided between Franich and Johnson on a 50-
50 basis after expenses. 
* * * 
12. Depreciation and expenses will be shared on a 
50-50 basis for tax purposes. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract involved in this 
action was executed October 31, 1978 between plaintiffs and 
defendant Real Estate Services. The assignment of that contract 
to defendants Joseph C. Franich and Carolyn M. Franich and Larry 
J. Nielson and Kay Nielson occurred October 30, 1979, three days 
after the agreement of appellant and Franich referred to above 
and is claimed to be one of the "long term investments" 
contemplated by the Franich - Johnson agreement (see paragraphs 2 
and 3 of appellant's affidavit, R. 27). Appellant was never a 
party to any contract or assignment, nor was the existence of a 
silent partner indicated by the documents executed by Franich. 
The appellant received a Quit Claim Deed from Joseph c. 
and Carolyn M. Franich September 15, 1981 (R. 28) and recorded it 
the same date in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
The parties have agreed in the Statement of Evidence that 
"intervenor's interest was not known to the plaintiffs nor any of 
the other defendants in the lawsuit (with the obvious exception 
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of Joseph C. Franich) and not of record until the 15th day of 
September, 1981," (the "knowledge" of plaintiffs or other 
defendants on that date being assumed from the fact of 
recordation). On September 25, 1981 intervenor determined 
through a realtor friend, that "a foreclosure action had 
commenced on one of the properties and that there were some 
problems with the delinquency on the property included on the 
above suit" (see paragraph 2, appellant's affidavit, R. 28). 
Appellant contacted plaintiffs' attorney and for the first time 
made known his alleged interest in the property on September 30, 
1981 (see paragraph 7, appellant's affidavit, R. 28), six days 
after the Writ of Restitution was served. 
Thereafter, appellant tendered the delinquency on the 
contract together with costs and attorney's fees to plaintiffs 
but the tender was refused. 
As shown by the Uniform Real Estate Contract (R. 6) the 
properties were sold by plaintiffs to defendant Real Estate 
Services for $86,600.00, $1,600.00 of which was paid by buyer 
assuming a note due December 1, 1979 and the balance payable at 
$760.49 per month commencing December 1, 1978. The sum 
forfeited, therefore, included the $1,600.00 note payment and 
$760.49 paid each month until May 14, 1981. Defendant Real 
Estate Services or its assignee, Joseph C. Franich, had 
possession of the property from November 1, 1978 through 
September 24, 1981, a period of thirty-two (32) months and 
twenty-three (23) days. Assuming that payments were made for 
each month through May, 1981 and commencing December 1, 1979 
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there would have been twenty-nine (29) payments at $760.49 each 
for a total of $22,054.21 paid on the contract (including 
interest) and an additional $1,600.00 paid on the note referred 
to as a down payment, for a total of $23,654.21 during nearly 
thirty-three (33) month's occupancy. Although the amount of the 
forfeiture is not an issue at this time, it appears that the 
buyers of the three (3) rental units paid a total of $716.79 per 
month for that occupancy. 
The motion of appellant to intervene in the action 
following judgment and to set the default judgment aside was 
heard by the District Court October 14, 1981 and following 
argument the motion to intervene was denied. It is believed that 
the minute entry is incorrect in stating that "the Motion to 
Intervene was considered moot since the Motion to set aside 
Default Judgment was denied 11 (R. 51). If the Court considered 
one of the motions "moot" it would obviously be the Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment, since appellant would have no standing to 
set aside the default judgment until he was permitted to 
intervene. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PROPOSED INTERVENOR IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING 
AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY THE SUBJECT OF THE 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION AS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS. 
Since the agreement between appellant and Joseph 
Franich of March 27, 1979 was not a matter of public record nor 
-6-
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did plaintiffs have any knowledge of such agreement until ·the 
Motion to Intervene was filed by appellant in the District Court, 
it is submitted that the proposed intervenor's "interest" was a 
secret or dormant interest and remained so until at least the 
15th day of September, 1981 when the Quit Claim Deed was placed 
of record. The agreement between appellant and Franich is, on 
its face, an agreement of joint venture or partnership. 
Appellant's conduct in permitting the ostensible partner or co-
venturer to enter into an assignment whereby he (together with 
his wife and two other parties) acquired an interest in a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract in their own names is such conduct as estops 
appellant from asserting any interest in the property as against 
plaintiffs. At C.J.S., Partnership, Section 176, Undisclosed and 
Dormant Partners, Notice and Demand, appears the following: 
"Dormant partner is estopped from asserting his 
real interest as against those who have in good 
faith acted on the appearance of the acting 
partner's sole ownership." 
The C.J.S. annotation quotes In Re Flynn's Estate, 43 P.2d 8, 181 
Wash. 284 (1935) in which the Court stated: 
"Where one partner is permitted to assume sole 
charge and superintendence of the property of an 
undisclosed or dormant partnership and to deal 
with it as his own, the property, though actually 
belonging to the partnership is, so far as 
innocent third persons are concerned, to be 
regarded as the sole property of the active 
partner, and the dormant partner is estopped from 
asserting his real interest therein as against 
those who have, in good faith, acted upon the 
appearance of the active partner's sole ownership 
(citing cases) . " 
This same principal is set forth at C.J.S. Partnership, 
Section 36A, Dormant or Secret Partners as follows: 
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"Where dormant partner permits the busii:ess world 
to believe that the ostensible partner is the 
owner of the business, he has been held to be 
estopped from claiming to the contrary against 
those who have in good faith acted on such 
appearance." 
By permitting the ostensible partner (Franich) to take an 
interest in real property in his own name, appellant Johnson 
placed Mr. and Mrs. Jenner in a position where they were entitled 
to act on appearances given by the ostensible partner and deal 
with him as though he were the only partner having an interest in 
the "partnership property". The "appearance" is further 
compounded by the addition of Mrs. Franich and the Nielsons on 
the Assignment document (R. 3). 
As set forth in 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Joint Venture, Section 
17, Purchase and Sale of Real Property: 
"Such property may be acquired and owned jointly 
by a joint venture although the title may be taken 
in the name of only one of the co-venturers." 
Such an arrangement results in innocent third parties having to 
deal with the co-venturer and others named in the property 
transaction as though they were the only parties having an 
interest. ·Mr. Johnson's remedy would appear to be a partnership 
accounting with Mr. Franich and, perhaps, as a result of the 
transaction wherein he acquired the Quit Claim Deed, an action 
for misrepresentation and recovery of the cash paid in exchange 
for the deed. Certainly there was a duty on the part of Franich, 
who acted in a fiduciary capacity with his co-venturer, to 
divulge that the Uniform Real Estate Contract had been declared 
in default and that an unlawful detainer action was then pending 
seeking possession of the property, cancellation of the contract, 
-8-
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and a determination that all monies paid were to be considered 
liquidated damages. 
POINT II 
NOTICE IN THE FORM OF BOTH THE NOTICE TO QUIT 
AND THE SUMMONS WERE NOTICE TO APPELLANT WHO 
WAS A CO-VENTURER OF THE PARTY SERVED. 
58 Am. Jur. 2d 506, Notice, Section 25, sets forth 
generally the law regarding notice to "co-owners" of real 
property. It is there stated: 
"Where two persons enter into a joint transaction 
for joint benefit, notice of a fact to one of them 
is also notice to both so far as that transaction 
is concerned." 
Among the cases there cited is Sweet Sixteen Company v. Sweet 
"16" Shop, 15 F2d 920 (8th Cir.) in which the federal court 
quotes 20 R.C.L. 355 to the effect that: "Notice to one partner 
is notice to other partners." 
It follows, therefore, that appellant Johnson had 
notice of the default in the payment of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract on the date that Joseph C. Franich received the Notice 
to Quit, August 8, 1981. It further follows that notice that 
plaintiffs sought cancellation of the contract, restoration of 
possession, and forfeiture of all payments made under the 
contract as liquidated damages, was given again in the form of a 
summons served on Joseph c. Franich September 11, 1981. 
Appellant Johnson is in the position of one who 
received notice of the delinquent condition of a real estate 
contract and waited 53 days (period between August 8, 
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1981 and September 30, 1981) to take any action with respect to 
remedying the default. In the meantime, an unlawful detainer 
action had been commenced by the filing of the complaint, 
summonses had been served on all named defendants, the default 
judgment had been entered, and the Writ of Restitution had been 
issued and served. Plaintiffs were thereafter in a position of 
dealing with the property as they saw fit having no obligation to 
convey to Mr. Franich and the other assignees. 
Although appellant may have been duped by his business 
partner and may have, as an individual, acted in good faith, ,he 
has permitted Franich to deal with the property of the joint 
venture in a manner affecting innocent third parties and the 
burden of any loss should be borne by appellant who still has his 
legal actions against his co-venturer. 
POINT III 
THE MOTION OF THE APPELLANT TO INTERVENE AFTER 
THE ENTRY OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN AN UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER ACTION UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS 
CASE IS NOT TIMELY. 
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
"Intervention of right. Upon timely application 
anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an 
action: (1) when a statute confers an 
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the 
re~re~entatio~ of .the applicant's interest by 
ex1s~1ng p~rt1es is or may be inadequate and the 
app~1cant is or may be bound by a judgment in the 
action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated 
as to b7 adv~r~ely affected by a distribution or 
other d1spos1t1on of property which is in the 
custody or subject to the control or disposition 
of the Court or an officer thereof." 
-10-
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Appellant argues that he is in the situation contemplated by 
number (3) above. 
Even if it were conceded that appellant is one whose 
situation is contemplated by the group designated (3) in our 
rules, the application of the proposed intervenor must be 
"timely". 
Although there are many cases wherein intervention 
after the entry of a judgment has been permitted, a reading of 
the cases annotated in United States Code Annotated (Title 28), 
Rule 24, establish that: 
"There is considerable reluctance on the part of 
courts to allow intervention after action has gone 
to judgment" (McClain v. Wagner Electric Corp., 
C • A • Mo . 1 9 7 7 , 5 5 0 F 2 d 1 1 1 5 ) ; "mot ions for 
intervention made after entry of final judgment 
will be granted only upon strong showing of 
entitlement and of justification for failure to 
request intervention sooner" (U.S. v. Association 
Milk Producers, Inc. C.A. Mo. 1976, 534 F2d 113, 
cert. denied, 97 s. Ct. 355, 429 U.S. 940, 50 L. 
Ed 2d 309); "post judgment interventions are 
generally disfavored because of the assumption 
that they will prejudice rights of existing 
parties and interfere with the orderly processes 
of the court (Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, D.C. Ka. 1979, 84 
F.R.D. 383); "intervention after entry of final 
judgment will not be allowed unless a strong 
showing is made or where unusual or compelling 
circumstances are demonstrated" (Com. of 
Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, D.C. Pa. 1975, 66 F.R.D. 
598, aff. 530 F.2d 501, cert. denied 96 S. Ct. 
2628, 426 U.S. 921, 49 L. Ed. 2d 375); 
"interventions after judgment have a strong 
tendency to prejudice existing parties to 
litigation or to interfere substantially with 
further legal process of court" (U.S. v. U.S. 
Steel Corporation, C.A. Ala. 1977, 548 F2d 1232). 
In Rains v. Lewis, 579 P2d 980, 20 Wash. App. 117 
(1978) the Court stated: 
"If (intervention is) permitted after judgment, it 
~ ~ ~~ -,1y on a strong showing after taking 
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prior notice of the lawsuit and circums-c.arH . .:t::;:, 
contributing to the delay in making the mo~ion. 
To this we would add a showing of substantial 
prejudice if permission to intervene is denied." 
Commenting on post-judgment intervention, the 
annotation at 37 A.L.R. 2d 1306 "Time for Intervention" states: 
"Subject to certain limitations, it is the general 
rule that, ordinarily, intervention will not be 
allowed after the final judgment or decree has 
been entered. (citing cases)" 
The Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Shawnee County, Kansas (supra) held that: 
"Determination as to tl'me limits of an 
intervention motion is a flexible one and must be 
made on a case-by-case basis taking into account 
all the appropriate circumstances." 
In Wilson v. Harris, 302 S.W. 2d 86, 227 Ark. 808 
(1957), intervenors were not named as defendants in an original 
quiet title action and sought to intervene more than one month 
after a decree was entered. The Court upheld the refusal to 
allow such intervention. In Stern G. Investment Co. v. Danziger, 
206 Cal. 456, 274 P. 748 (1929) it was held in a quiet title 
action that the intervenor's claim being "only from or under" 
that of defendants already in default, this precluded 
intervention as a matter of right. 
In Martin v. Lawrence, 156 Cal. 191, 103 P. 913 (1909), 
the Court barred intervenor from entering the action where he 
took title from a party in default after the recording of a Lis 
Pendens. Respondents in the instant case contend that the notice 
given appellant by service of both the Notice to Quit and the 
Summons on his co-venturer is as effective in barring 
intervention as though there had been a Lis Pendens recorded~ 
-1?-
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Both are forms of constructive notice and should be equally 
effective. 
POINT IV 
THE MOTION OF THE APPELLANT TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS MOOT IF HE IS NOT PERMITTED 
TO INTERVENE AND WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
A motion to set aside a judgment is to be considered 
and decided by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion 
and its decision should be overturned on appeal only if it 
plainly appears that it has abused its discretion. Haller v. 
Wallace, 573 P.2d 1302 89 Wash. 2d 539 (1978), Pamilen 
Industries, Inc. v. Sheen - U.S.A., Inc. 622 P.2d 1270 95 Wash. 
2d 398 (1981). Under the circumstances here the district court 
judge properly exercised his discretion. He correctly ruled that 
the appellant was not entitled to intervene, and the matter of 
setting aside the default judgment thereby became moot. 
Even if appellant were not faced with the problem of 
intervention, it has been held that in discussing the proper 
exercise of discretion by a trial court in permitting the 
vacating of a judgment, there are several factors which should be 
considered including: (1) the moving party must show substantial 
evidence to support, prima facie, a defense to the claim; (2) 
failure to appear must be due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise 
or excusable neglect; (3) the moving party must have acted with 
due dil.igence after notice of entry of default; (4) there should 
be no substantial hardship result to the opposing party if the 
judgment is set aside; see White v. Holm, 438 P.2d 581, 73 Wash. 
~~ ~AO 110~0\ 
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It appears that appellant is unable to show a prima 
facie defense to the claim since all parties admit that the 
contract was delinquent and the forfeiture of the sums paid by 
the buyers was not out of proportion to the reasonable rental 
value of the property during its occupancy. Although the record 
is silent on what hardships might result to plaintiffs if the 
judgment is set aside, the appellant has failed to show that no 
substantial hardship would result to plaintiffs if their motion 
was granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant being a silent or dormant partner or co-
venturer with defendant Franich is held to have received the same 
notice as did Franich. He should not be permitted to intervene 
in the unlawful detainer action following entry of judgment and 
issuance of Writ of Restitution not only for the reason that his 
application to intervene was not timely under the circumstances 
but he is estopped by virtue of his silent partnership status to 
claim an interest in the real property the subject of the 
unlawful detainer action. 
DATED this day of March, 1982. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Allen M. Swan 
Attorneys for Respondents 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served appellant's counsel, Lee 
Rudd, of Hunt & Rudd, two copies of the foregoing Respondents' 
Brief by mailing to said attorney at 311 South State Street, 
Suite 440, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 this day of March, 
1982. 
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